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Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: 
Foreign investors sought… on Russian terms
Iwona Wiśniewska
In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed 
co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s 
ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to 
Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these 
Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will 
also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase 
of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or 
in South America). 
Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian 
government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Rus-
sian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, 
investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and 
some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far 
also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is 
being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled 
the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this 
policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain 
access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to rein-
force their positions in international markets. 
The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that produc-
tion will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain 
whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its devel-
opment will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic 
shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The devel-
opment of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, 
may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal 
regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign in-
vestors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign 
support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically 
complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic 
scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen 
to twenty years at the earliest. 
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The terms of Rosneft’s deals with the Western companies
On 16 April, Rosneft and ExxonMobil signed an agreement concerning the exploration 
of the offshore fields on the Kara Sea and the Black Sea. Rosneft entered into a similar agree-
ment with Eni on 25 April (concerning the fields on the Barents Sea and the Black Sea), and 
with Statoil on 5 May (concerning the fields on the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk; 
see map). All three agreements are based on a similar pattern. Rosneft will form joint ventures 
for each of the fields with foreign investors, who will hold a minority stake (33.3%) in such joint 
ventures. Licences for the development of these fields will still be owned by Rosneft. The pri-
mary aim of the joint ventures will be to explore and prepare the field for production. This work 
will be financed by the foreign investors (it is estimated that they will spend between US$2 
and 3 billion each; for more information, see Appendix). Furthermore, Rosneft has also gained 
access to minority stakes in projects being 
carried out by its Western partners in other 
countries (for example, in South America, 
Africa or in the North Sea), and thus 
the opportunity to become familiar with 
their technologies and to train staff. 
However it is still unknown, whether pro-
duction will be possible in these fields. The  experience of Chevron, who withdrew from in-
vestment in the exploration of the field near Tuapse (Shatsky Ridge) in the Black Sea in 2011, 
having found it to be unprofitable, shows that the prospects of the fields remain uncertain. 
Chevron was replaced by Italy’s Eni in April this year. Furthermore, the development of these 
fields will require vast financial outlays. According to current estimates, the projects to be 
implemented with Statoil on the Barents Sea may consume between US$35 and 40 billion, 
and on the Sea of Okhotsk between US$30 and 60 billion (see Appendix). The partners will 
have to negotiate the conditions of the next stage of investment. Some doubts have also arisen 
over Rosneft’s capability and readiness to finance the investment in proportion to its shares. 
Since the crisis in 2008, capital has started to flow out of Russia (US$84 billion in 2011 
as compared to US$34 billion in 2010). This suggests that the conditions of doing business 
and investment safety in Russia are also not accepted by local entrepreneurs, who prefer to 
invest in foreign markets instead. One manifestation of this is the increasing activity of Russian 
energy corporations abroad which has been observed in the last two years. 
Foreign investors in the Russian energy sector
The fact that Rosneft has signed the agreements with ExxonMobil, Eni and Statoil means 
the Russian government is continuing its policy of a controlled opening up of the Russian 
energy sector to foreign investors. 
In 2006–2007 (during Vladimir Putin’s 
second term as president), the Russian 
government decided to privatise Rosneft’s 
minority stakes and to selectively grant 
some foreign companies access to the pro-
duction sector (for example, shares in the 
Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field were purchased 
by Germany’s BASF) and to privatise a sig-
nificant part of the power generation sector. 
However, the increasing presence of foreign investors in the energy sector was halted in 2008 
due to the financial crisis and the limited investment activity of global corporations. 
ExxonMobil, Eni and Statoil will ex-
plore natural resources in the Russian 
Arctic, in exchange for which Rosneft 
will gain access to foreign assets. 
The fact that the agreements have 
been signed means that the policy 
of a controlled opening up 
of the Russian energy sector 
to foreign investors will continue.
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High oil and gas prices over the past year have triggered a greater interest in investment 
in this sector. For this reason the Russian government resumed its policy of a partial open-
ing up to foreign investors. In 2011, France’s Total was given consent to acquire a minority 
stake in Novatek, Russia’s largest private gas company. In August 2011, Rosneft signed 
a strategic partnership agreement with ExxonMobil, envisaging the development of Rus-
sian Arctic fields (the agreement signed on 16 April this year is a practical implementation 
of these declarations). Rosnieft’s entering into the three agreements concerning fields on 
the continental shelf in the past few weeks is another stage of this process.
Key Russian politicians – including Vladimir Putin, who was present on the occasion of all 
the major agreements being signed – have been directly engaged in establishing contact 
between Russian companies and their Western partners. 
The Russian government’s approach to the development of the oil sector
The Russian government has been making efforts to make the Russian energy sector more 
attractive and to restrict the investment risk. For example, in April this year, Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin signed an ordinance which envisages the introduction of special fiscal prefer-
ences for state-owned companies engaged in projects on the continental shelf. The prefer-
ences will include lifting export duty for the offshore fields and reducing the rate of the tax on 
natural resources to 5–15% (depending on the difficulty level of production). However, it is 
still unknown when these changes will become effective. The government has also decided 
to introduce a zero VAT rate and other allowances for imported equipment (which has no 
Russian equivalent) used on these fields. 
The Russian government has still not an-
nounced any legal changes which would 
enable private investors to have real ac-
cess crude. The legislation concerning nat-
ural resources currently in force restricts 
the possibilities for private companies to 
acquire shares in licences for the development of offshore fields (as of 2008, the state-
owned companies, Rosneft and Gazprom, are the only companies to have access to fields on 
the Russian continental shelf, with the exception of the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov). 
Despite the government’s declarations, the conditions of doing business in Russia, including 
those related to the protection of private property and claiming one’s rights in court, have 
not improved, and the corruption level has not been reduced. 
The goals of the controlled opening up in the energy sector
This policy of the Russian government means that Russia intends to capitalise on the high 
demand for hydrocarbons. In the opinion of specialists this will continue for the next few dec-
ades. High oil and gas prices (the current price of one barrel of oil is approximately US$110) 
are contributing to increasing global investments in this sector (IHS CERA estimates that 
a total of US$1.23 trillion will be invested in the energy sector across the world in 2012, 
and the investments will grow by more than 30% within the next four years). Furthermore, 
an increase in demand for hydrocarbons by approximately 25% by 2030 has been forecast 
for example by the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Russia, being one of the key oil and gas producers, does not wish to find itself outside the 
main trends. According to forecasts (for example by the IEA), oil production in Russia will be-
gin to fall after 2015. The development of new fields, which is in most cases technologically 
complicated and very expensive, requires changes in the rules of operation in this sector. 
The present legislation pertaining to 
the energy sector prevents the Russian 
Arctic from being developed.
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The new resources are located in regions of Russia that are increasingly more difficult to 
access, including the Arctic shelf, where Russian companies have very limited experience 
(for example, Rosneft only holds a minority stake in the Sakhalin-1 project, where the main 
investor is ExxonMobil). 
Additionally, through offering access for foreign partners to Russian resources on terms of the 
exchange of assets, Russian energy companies are gaining access to shares in projects outside 
Russia. This gives them the opportunity to 
become familiar with new technologies and 
to train their staff. They are also making 
their business international and reinforcing 
their position on global markets. 
Furthermore, the Russian government ex-
pects that the development of the conti-
nental shelf will help boost Russian industry, for example that part of the contracts for new 
platforms or ships will be awarded to Russian shipyards. 
However, maintaining the Kremlin’s control of the energy sector remains the overriding ob-
jective in the Russian policy of opening up to foreign investors. This sector is the foundation 
of the Russian economy. It generates the majority of budget and export revenues and thus 
determines to a great extent Russia’s international position. At the same time it enables the 
redistribution of funds and allows people linked to the ruling class to amass private fortunes. 
Conclusions
1. Rosneft’s deals with ExxonMobil, Eni and Statoil mark an important step towards the de-
velopment of the Russian continental shelf but this does not mean it is a foregone conclusion 
that this venture will be successful. First it is necessary to explore these fields and to analyse 
the possibilities and the efficiency of production there. Then specific terms of co-operation 
must be agreed in the next phase of the project (development and production) that will be 
acceptable to all the parties and which will allow these investments worth billions of dollars 
to be financed. According to estimates, the first supplies of oil from the Arctic fields will be 
made in fifteen to twenty years’ time at the earliest. 
2. It is still unknown to what extent Rosneft will use the option of acquiring shares in the 
foreign assets of its partners. The details of these deals (including the price) are still to be 
agreed. It is also uncertain whether Rosneft will be ready for large investments in a situation 
where it is planning to develop its own fields. Nevertheless, it is doubtless that it will use 
some of these projects to gain experience, to train staff and above all to receive access to 
new technological solutions. 
3. From the point of view of foreign investors, the agreements with Rosneft offer a chance 
for further co-operation, also in development of the fields, which would offer them access 
to Russian deposits and thus boost their economic indicators and improve their position 
on the stock exchange. The Russian part of the Arctic shelf is the largest area in the world 
which has not been explored in terms of the presence of deposits. Foreign companies are 
aware of the fact that Russian firms do not have the experience or technologies necessary 
for oil and gas production in the offshore fields by themselves. Access to new fields, given 
the high prices of raw materials and the increasing demand, is of key significance for these 
foreign companies. It is also worth noting that the conditions of investing in the energy sec-
tor in Russia as compared to other oil producers (for example in the Persian Gulf or in North 
Africa) may turn out to be competitive. Therefore, more deals concerning the exploration 
of the Russian Arctic by foreign investors may be expected in the immediate future. 
Maintaining the Kremlin’s control 
of the energy sector remains the over-
riding objective in the Russian policy 
of opening up to foreign investors.
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4. For investment projects to be successful deep changes in the operation of the Russian 
energy sector are necessary (not only in the taxes imposed on this sector but also in the 
rules of access to the fields, etc.). However, it is unlikely that the Russian government will 
be able to overcome its fears of Russia being dominated by foreign investors (which Vladimir 
Putin wrote about in his article on the economy in April this year). He will thus decide to 
create such conditions for them to invest billions of dollars in Russia so that the money allo-
cated to the oil sector will also contribute to the development of other industries, for example 
shipbuilding. At present, the law does not guarantee foreign companies clear rules of opera-
tion in Russia. The direct agreements which receive strong political support (including from 
Vladimir Putin) also turn out to be an insufficient guarantee for successful co-operation (this 
was proven by the break-up of co-operation between Rosneft and BP in 2011). 
5. Rosneft’s deals with foreign investors and the fact that they are promoted personally by 
Vladimir Putin also show that the energy sector is and will remain the key sector of the Rus-
sian economy for the present ruling class. The diversification of the foundations of the Rus-
sian economic development will remain at the level of declarations. While oil prices remain 
high, which guarantees that the budget goals are fulfilled and the welfare state functions 
(which a significant part of Russian public expect from their government), the government 
will not decide to carry out any radical economic reforms that could not only limit its control 
of the capital flow in the energy sector but could also give rise to real economic and political 
competition in Russia.
Rosneft’s Western partners on the Russian continental shelf
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Rosneft’s agreements with Western companies
Western 
partners 
of Rosneft
Fields on the Russian 
continental shelf
Estimated costs Assets offered 
outside Russia
Additional comments
ExxonMobil Tuapse (the Black Sea);
East-Prinovozemelsky 
(the Kara Sea)
Exploration: 
US$3.2 billion,
Development:
US$200–300 
billion
30% in the La Escalera 
Ranch project in West 
Texas (USA);
30% in 20 blocks 
in the western part 
of the Gulf of Mexico;
30% of the shares 
in a company which 
develops unconventional 
oil deposits in Alberta 
(Canada)
The co-operation envisages 
a technology and staff 
exchange. The creation 
of a technology centre 
in Saint Petersburg
The companies also signed 
an agreement on developing 
technologies for oil extraction 
from unconventional deposits 
in Western Siberia
Eni Fedinsky and 
Tsentralno- 
-Barentsevsky 
(the Barents Sea);
West Black Sea 
(the Shatsky Ridge) 
(the Black Sea)
Exploration: 
US$2 billion,
Development:
US$100–125 
billion
North Africa, 
and in the future also 
America and part of Eni’s 
European projects
The US company Chevron 
withdrew from the project 
on the Black Sea 
in mid 2011
Statoil Perseevsky 
(the Barents Sea)
Kashevarovsky, 
Lisyansky, Magadan-1 
(the Sea of Okhotsk)
Exploration: 
US$2.5 billion 
Development: 
US$35–40 
billion, and in the 
Sea of Okhotsk: 
US$30–60 billion
Several deposits 
in the North Sea 
and in the Norwegian part 
of the Barents Sea 
The partners will also jointly 
explore two Russian 
onshore fields: 
Severo-Komsomolsky 
in Western Siberia 
and unconventional oil 
deposits near Stavropol
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